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Abstract
In 2014, Lord Saatchi launched his ultimately unsuccessful Medical Innovation Bill in the UK. Its laudable aim was to free
doctors from the shackles that prevented them from providing responsible innovative treatment. Lord Saatchi’s principal
contention was that current law was the unsurmountable barrier that prevented clinicians from delivering innovative
treatments to cancer patients when conventional options had failed. This was because doctors feared that they might be
sued or tried and convicted of gross negligence manslaughter if they deviated from standard practice. Concerns about
fear of the law and potential negative effects on medical practice are not new. Fear of litigation has been suggested as the
reason for doctors practising “defensive medicine,” by opting for treatments regarded as “grievance-resistant,”
rather than clinically indicated, for example, by ordering diagnostic tests or performing certain procedures, which
are not strictly medically necessary. Whilst this claim is plausible and apparently accepted by the courts, there is limited
empirical evidence in support of it so far as practitioners in the UK are concerned. In this paper, we report on our
empirical research which provides a snapshot of medical opinion to begin to rectify this gap. We ran focus groups of
different medical specialties, asking what these medical practitioners thought the barriers to medical innovation to
be. We found that fear of the law was not the principal barrier to be lowered, and that the answer was far
more multifaceted.
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Introduction
In 2014, Lord Saatchi launched his ultimately unsuc-
cessful Medical Innovation Bill in the UK. Its laudable
aim was to free doctors from the shackles that he per-
ceived prevented them from providing responsible
innovative treatment. Lord Saatchi’s principal conten-
tion was that current law was the unsurmountable
barrier that prevented clinicians from delivering inno-
vative treatments to cancer patients when conventional
options had failed. This was because doctors feared
that they might be sued or tried and convicted of
gross negligence manslaughter if they deviated from
standard practice.1,2 Concerns about fear of the
law and potential negative effects on medical practice
are not new. Fear of litigation has been suggested as
the reason for doctors practising “defensive medicine,”
by opting for treatments regarded as “grievance-
resistant,”3–6 rather than clinically indicated, for exam-
ple, by ordering diagnostic tests or performing certain
procedures, which are not strictly medically
necessary.7,8 Whilst this claim is plausible and appar-
ently accepted by the courts9–11 (cf. Hartshorne et al.,12
p.522), there is limited empirical evidence in support of
it so far as practitioners in the UK are concerned,8,13,14
although more extensive studies have been conducted
in Canada15 and the United States.16,17 Yet this is
not the only piece of legislation that uses reform of
negligence law as a means of encouraging medical
innovation. The “Right to Try” laws in the US –
including the Federal version, the Right to Try Act
2018 – effectively remove the patient’s ability to sue
in negligence over decisions to provide experimental
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treatment (although the legislation does not prevent
the patient bringing an action if the treatment was pro-
vided in a negligent manner).
Our research seeks to address the gap in empirical
knowledge by asking health professionals what they
themselves see as the barriers to innovating responsibly.
We sought to assess whether fear of the law was indeed
the primary factor, but also what other obstacles might
exist. Barriers need to be identified if these are to be
overcome.
Research method
Focus groups were used to explore perceptions about
barriers to responsible innovation. This is a time effi-
cient method of generating data that cannot be
obtained easily using techniques such as surveys.18
They are known to provide an “insiders” view of the
realities of a topic and permit in-depth exploration of
central issues whereby participants present their ideas,
hear from others and then question one another about
their insights.19
A purposive approach to recruitment was used and
participants were invited by the research team. Five
focus groups were held with a total of 26 participants.
The groups were divided into specialisms: (i) surgeons
(including those in orthopaedics, vascular, ear nose and
throat, plastic and gastro-intestinal surgery); (ii) gener-
al practitioners (including specialist interest and private
practitioners); (iii) allied health professionals (including
a nurse consultant, matron, accident and emergency,
outpatients and ward sisters); (iv) oncologists (NHS,
researchers and private practitioners); (v) a mixed
group (including rheumatologists, consultant physi-
cians, anaesthetists and paediatricians).
The focus groups followed the model advocated by
Krueger20 in that all interviews commenced with an
opening question on definitions followed by prompts
and ending with a final specific question. The groups
commenced by ascertaining participants’ understand-
ing of “responsible innovation.” This was an important
prequel in that some groups understood “innovation”
as service improvement, while others saw it as techno-
logical or pharmaceutical developments. The closing
question asked each participant to identify the key bar-
rier to innovation from their own perspective.
Focus groups took place in vacant hospital offices
using voice recorders and notebooks. All groups were
facilitated by an experienced moderator and co-
moderator.
Analysis
Verbatim transcripts were generated within a week of
each session and verified for accuracy to ensure that
speech extractions could be mapped to follow individ-
ual contributions. Unabridged transcription-based
analysis was chosen as the most rigorous strategy to
adopt.21 Audio records were supplemented by field
notes that were used to capture overarching themes
that emerged during conversations.
The data sets were analysed using a variant of
content analysis. Words and phrases were assigned to
conceptual categories which revealed the significance of
ideas by the frequency with which they pervaded dis-
cussions.22 The data were categorised systematically
according to initial themes that emerged. The tran-
scripts from each group were analysed independently
by two researchers to limit the potential for personal
bias influencing the results.
The results and discussion are presented using over-
arching themes and illustrative quotations. The groups
are indicated as follows: S¼ surgeons; ONC¼
oncologists; MG¼mixed group; GP¼ general practi-
tioners and AHP¼ allied health professionals. The
numbers refer to specific participants in each group.
The themes that emerged were (a) definitional issues,
(b) fear of the law, (c) fear of the regulator, (d) access,
(e) governance, (f) costs and (g) miscellaneous issues.
Results
Definitional issues. The groups defined innovation in dif-
ferent ways. Surgeons saw innovation was an intrinsic
part of practical surgery. All had innovated in accor-
dance with clinical need. They defined innovation
widely, including doing things slightly differently to
achieve the same result. Thus:
we can seal a vessel with clips, with sutures, with dia-
thermy or you can use ultrasonics or advanced bi-
polar, so those energy devices aren’t new but you are
still achieving the same . . .So you are innovating in the
technology that you are using but the end result would
be the same. [S4]
Equally, oncologists saw innovation as part and parcel
of all aspects of their work. Indeed, “[a] mantra we’ve
got sort of out there on the wall is today’s research is
tomorrow’s medicine” [ONC 1]. As one of them
explained, “local trial recruitment is embedded within
our service specification” [ONC 1]. Another stated:
“our aspiration is that every patient, every entry into
their journey will enter some form of research . . . and
whether at the diagnostic level or . . . or treatment level
or palliative care setting” [ONC 3]. Nevertheless, they
did wonder whether they were exceptional, as they are
a relatively new specialty and “probably one of the first
that the expectation was that we would have a research
degree” [ONC 2]. For these two specialties innovation
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was something to be actively sought, and was part of
everyday clinical care.
In contrast, the other groups, particularly the GPs
and AHPs, saw innovation as a reaction to problems
with existing processes. GPs focussed on organisational
issues, seeing innovation as increased efficiency and
greater throughput of patients. It was more about
“making the system work” [GP3]. Indeed, they saw
themselves as in the middle of an inefficient system,
and that innovation was necessary to enhance patient
care. They felt pressured by lack of resources, and saw
innovation as a way to mitigate this. The AHPs felt
similarly that innovation was about improving patient
care within the existing paradigm. One described inno-
vation as “going that bit further with the patients
and thinking of logistics and how you can meet their
holistic needs, but you still need to work within the
premises of policy and guidance.” [AHP 2]. In other
words, these groups felt constrained by external factors
(for GPs it was resources and “the system,” whereas
it was policy and guidance for AHPs). They saw inno-
vation as a means of improving patient care through
efficiency initiatives. For these groups innovation was a
necessity rather than an aspiration.
However, there was one common thread. As a pae-
diatrician suggested: “innovation is the heart and soul
of the working of any doctor, clinician worth his or her
salt . . . [b]ecause it amounts to problem solving” [MG
4]. How much it was sought depended on the size of the
problem that needed to be solved.
Fear of the law. The law regulates the practice of all
health professionals, and all the groups alluded to the
manner in which the law influenced or affected their
work. The extent to which the law was perceived as a
barrier varied widely between groups. Fear of litigation
was discussed, and GPs as a group were by far the most
suspicious of the law and lawyers, being highly critical of
what they regarded as bureaucracy and “tick-box” exer-
cises they had to complete to avoid sanction. Some
groups were concerned that other aspects of legal regu-
lation, for example, patent rights negatively affecting
clinicians’ options to work with pharmaceutical compa-
nies. GPs were also concerned about coronial backlash
in the event of patient death during innovative therapy.
We consider the responses of each focus group below.
Mixed group: Intellectual property law as a poten-
tial barrier to innovation was identified by the mixed
group. One participant expressed fear of losing control
over intellectual property rights: “ . . . when you devel-
op something, how do you trust somebody [not to]
pinch your ideas, taking your ideas . . . intellectual
property” [MG 2].
Another participant suggested that the law or legal
requirements might deter pharmaceutical companies
from collaborating with individuals with innovative
ideas, for fear of financial liability either in the way
of royalties, or in damages in event of being sued.
One person stated: “I believe that the industry markets
that makes devices or drugs . . . often feel very, very sus-
picious because they don’t want to encourage that
[innovation] in case they become involved in the intel-
lectual property of that idea.”; and “[a pharmaceutical]
company might say well we don’t want you in on this
because it’s our drug and if we take you up on this, we
might be liable and owe lots of money to you” [MG1].
Several participants indicated that fear of litigation
had led them to act defensively, by extensively docu-
menting advice and treatment given and consulting
colleagues, or to act conservatively. One stated: “does
it lead to defensive medicine . . . ? . . . If you look at the
orthopaedic surgeons’ letters, they are going to do
a . . . hip replacement, and then there is a whole para-
graph . . . . It cautions patients about infection, thrombo-
sis, loosening, all of the above, it’s all there, ok, but that’s
defensive medicine,we’ve been pushed into this position
by litigation and by controlling authorities . . . ” [MG1].
The effect of the legal profession was perceived as detri-
mental to medical practice: “There’s one elephant in the
room, . . . this compunction to follow and compromise is
born out of that hold that legal profession has had in
medicine as of late and to that extent, I think we have
forgotten that expense, our integrity . . . ” [MG4].
Keeping good clinical notes and working in partner-
ship with colleagues was seen as being beneficial,
particularly if litigation ensued, as the courts were will-
ing to recognise proper practice:
I think some of the litigation cases have gone the other
way [that is in favour of the doctor], when the doctor has
good notes and support and you know collaboration,
working with colleagues and things like that, and in
quite serious cases and the doctor has been shown to do
everything they could in that situation, whereas before that
would probably would have gone a different way with the
pressures, so I think things are changing . . . [MG3]
Ultimately, although some criticisms of the law were
raised, none of the mixed group identified the law, or
the fear of litigation, as being their principal barrier to
innovation.
Surgeons: None of the surgeons specifically men-
tioned the law as the key barrier to innovation when
asked to summarise their views. Increasing legal and
regulatory oversight was, however, highlighted as
having curbed surgical innovation in general:
. . . innovation, many can argue, was easier in the 60 s
and 70 s, where you could more or less do what you
like, there wasn’t laws and ethical committee, consent
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was not a big issue and you just say to the patients, this
might help you, I’m prepared to give it a go, are you on
board and they go or not . . . . The regulation round it is
a fine line. It’s got tighter and tighter, so you could
argue that some of that is stifled innovation, because
if you’ve got a new idea or whatever, ittakes a lot to get
through all the regulations . . . [S5]
In relation to the fear of litigation, the surgeons indi-
cated that they were far more concerned about the risk
of being suspended by their employer, which would
effectively end their career with catastrophic effects
upon their livelihood: “I think for a lot of us it’s not
being sued, it’s your livelihood, I suspect that you
wouldn’t be sued, . . . but your hospital may well sus-
pend you for not going through the right [process
committees]” [S5]; “Yes they would”[S3]; “That’s the
end of your career”[S2];
I think that it’s a livelihood thing. You would have to
go and say to your wife, ‘You have to go back out to
work to pay for the mortgage, ‘cause I’m unem-
ployed . . . and the children have to go to Oxfam for
shoes’ . . .That’s a big problem. [S5]
General practitioners: The GP group was by far the
most trenchant in its criticism of the law and lawyers.
They were particularly critical of the amount of form
filling and documentation which they regarded as being
required to prevent legal consequences but were an oner-
ous check on their clinical discretion: “ . . . it’s over doc-
umentation. And I think for medical legal purposes, the
nurses have to show that they have been there, there
were two nurses and different checks” [GP1];
. . . I think whoever makes this sort of law, I think they
have to beresponsible . . . .we are all tick boxing every
day and we have to. Otherwise we get earmites . . . . it
stifles [us] too much, so there needs to be some sort of
responsible, sensible approach to individual freedoms
really . . . [GP5]
This group was the only one to mention fear of the
coroner as negatively influencing their practice. One
doctor expressed concern about coroners focusing
upon whether a doctor had completed the Patient
Questionnaire-9 (known as PWQ-9,23 an assessment
tool designed to facilitate the recognition and diagnosis
of depression in patients) when diagnosing potentially
depressed patients, rather than upon the substance of
the interaction between doctor and patient, and of the
potential obloquy which might be heaped upon a doc-
tor’s head.
Fear of litigation, or of coronial intervention in rela-
tion to the end-of-life treatment of patients was also
identified by the group as a barrier to innovation, with
concerns that too many resources were directed at defen-
sive over-treatment and monitoring of the dying:
I think that there is so much money being spent at the
end of life when really if we went back to our roots, to
following common sense, you know, keep patients
comfortable . . . It is one of the blocks of innovation,
I’m sure of it. [GP3]
“Lawyers again, they’ll be on your back” [GP4];
“Check every fourteen days otherwise they will go to
the coroners.24,25 That means aGP does a home visit
every day . . . ” [GP1].
One participant was particularly scathing of the per-
ceived role of lawyers in inhibiting innovation, and
suggested that the law’s influence should be removed
from medical practice:
I think the most dangerous people are lawyers. They
have been a block to innovation, both in terms of lit-
igation but also in terms of stopping more innovation
in healthcare than we have . . . I think politics and law
should be taken out of medicine, we should take con-
trol of medicine ourselves again . . . [GP4]
Another expressed concern (based on personal experi-
ence) that the law was too patient-focused, which led to
the reality of the situation and patient non-compliance
being overlooked:
. . .medical law is very patient centred and protected.
So I had a patient who eventually asked for a claim
because she was diagnosed with cancer and they felt she
could have been diagnosed maybe twenty days
earlier . . .But it did not see the fact thatshe delayed
her hospital appointments, that she actually, she did
not go a lot of times and did not take it seriously . . . she
did attend and then they discharged her and then they
referred her again. They didn’t see those aspects, . . .
they think about those two weeks only. If you had
followed the protocols, that’s a two week referral,
you’re protected. If you had done an urgent referral,
you’re not protected . . . never mind the fact that it
would have not have altered the course . . . common
sense has completely gone . . . [GP1]
Allied health professionals: The views of the AHPs
were markedly different from the other groups.
Whilst restrictions imposed by professional regulation
and policy guidance were discussed, there was no indi-
cation that the group regarded the law as a barrier to
innovation. Apart from brief mention of the Charlie
Gard case26–29 and the difficulty of balancing use of
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innovative treatments against the best interests of the
child, the law was not specifically discussed.
Oncologists: Although Lord Saatchi suggested fear
of being sued or prosecuted inhibited oncologists from
providing innovative treatments,1 none of the oncolo-
gists expressed fear of litigation, or regarded the law as
a barrier to its provision. Indeed, the group was gener-
ally critical of the Medical Innovation Bill, regarding it
as unnecessary and unhelpful. One participant
regarded the current regime as striking an appropriate
balance between permitting innovation and protecting
patients and practitioners:
I think that the way that we are regulated now, that if
you do things properly, the whole point of having pro-
tocols, the whole point of going through ethics is so
that you actually provide a safe place to innovate for
both patients and staff. [ONC 3]
The only specific legal barrier to innovation mentioned
by this group was in relation to clinical drugs trials.
One member of the group indicated that increased
European Union regulation had led to trials being
moved outside of the United Kingdom: “We used to
run a lot of studies here in the UK . . . and then we had
all the EU directives and that kind of thing and I would
say that bureaucracy can be a problem . . . ”[ONC3].
Fear of the regulator. A founding hypotheses of the proj-
ect was that a potential barrier to responsible innovation
might be fear of regulatory action from the professional
regulatory bodies such as the General Medical Council
(GMC) or the Nursing and Midwifery Council. The
results suggest, however, that this was not considered
to be a paramount barrier by participants.
Surgeons, for example, considered that practising
within one’s competence was a requirement of the
GMC. Theoretically, this could therefore be a barrier
to innovation. The paradox here, however, was that
innovation, by definition (which from the surgical per-
spective involved mainly new devices and techniques),
would be subject to a “learning curve” where compe-
tence could be established and aggregated gradually.
Undertaking innovation could therefore be seen as
the necessary aggregation of an evidence-base for a
new product or device which would therefore fall out-
side the strict regulatory remit of the regulator, provid-
ed that the innovation fell within the ambit of good
medical practice. Likewise, the oncologists perceived
that the GMC requirements actually facilitated use of
“off licence” products for the treatment of seriously ill
patients.
These two specialist groups perceived innovation
as a new way of treating the patient, rather than
experimenting on patients. This reflects the view
in Walker-Smith v GMC30 where the Court acknowl-
edged that the fundamental distinction between
medical practice and research is based on the intention
of the responsible health professional concerned.
According to the court, where a
clinician departs in a significant way from standard or
accepted practice entirely for the benefit of a particular
individual patient, and with consent, the innovation
need not constitute research, though it may be
described as an experiment in the sense that it is
novel and unvalidated. (Walker-Smith v GMC,30
pp.11–12).
A contrasting view was evident from the GP, AHP and
mixed groups where the majority felt that some of the
primary barriers to innovation might have a secondary
effect that could trigger regulatory action. Examples
included the requirement to follow local policies and
rules. Breach of these local requirements could lead to
reporting to the regulator and prompt further action.
Some participants stated that professional colleagues
might refer an innovator to the GMC under the guise
of “maverick” practice. A further barrier related to the
over-burdensome and bureaucratic documentation that
had become a routine part of practice. The time
involved meant that there was little capacity for inno-
vation which would encroach upon clinical time, there-
by leading to mistakes which might result in regulatory
action. It was felt that the primary role of the regulator
would focus on practice rather than the detail of the
innovation per se. There was an expectation that
the detail around the innovation would be governed
by regulatory functions carried outside the remit of
the professional regulator.
Approximately half of the participants across all
groups identified “employment regulation” as a signif-
icant barrier to innovation. This fear was premised on
the growing corpus of local and employment rules
within which individuals work. Factors such as tight
managerial control and a hierarchical “top down”
approach demanded rigid adherence to local policies
that could act as a significant barrier to responsible
innovation. This management ethos was considered
to derive from a several factors, principally “efficiency
of services” and “improvements [in delivery].” Breach
of employment regulations could jeopardise the indi-
vidual’s career. In these circumstances, when there is
already “enough to do,” this could impose a further
barrier to innovation which would add a further layer
to the already burdensome structure of managerial
control.
Access. An underlying barrier to responsible innovation
was that of access, although this meant different things
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to different groups. For oncologists a shared concern
was the ability to access continued (often unlicensed)
treatment at the end of a clinical trial. Although suit-
able patients were often able to access treatment that
was still under clinical development initially (whether
on compassionate grounds or as part of a clinical trial)
continued provision at the end of that period was more
challenging. Reasons for this could be due to the length
of time required for a drug to be approved. They could
also be economic, particularly when the drug was expen-
sive in terms of quality adjusted life years and had not
been approved by the National Institute for Health and
Care Excellence. It could also be due to lack of efficacy
sufficient to approve the drug for general adoption. This
is a fundamental aspect of many clinical trials. Although
individual patients may experience benefits, a drug will
not be adopted for general use unless its efficacy is
proven sufficiently. Ultimately this could impact nega-
tively on patient recruitment in that
[although] we’ve got a licenced drug, we know that it’s
amazing, but it is so expensive we can’t access it and I
do think that this is starting to have an impact on
innovation, and people recognising that we’ve been
involved in some clinical trials with some great drug
that we can’t use in our NHS practice . . . . and actually
that’s frustrating. [ONC 1]
Furthermore, even if a promising drug did receive early
approval this was usually on condition that the manu-
facturer would continue to carry out registration trials
to ensure that the drug was safe to use, “but they
haven’t always done those trials which has then been
difficult” [ONC 2] which was mainly because of finance
and limited potential markets.
For GPs, who were generally supportive of respon-
sible innovation, the most significant constraints to
access were time, space and money. Space was not lim-
ited to physical space but rather space to have ideas,
and the ability to reflect upon what was needed for
patients as well as service provision.
For surgical specialities, significant positive innova-
tions tended to have resource implications. Initiatives
such as robotic and keyhole surgery, for example, had
high start-up costs and frequently led to centralised
services. While this was useful for grant funding and
clinical trials, this could affect access for patients who
could not access centres of excellence.
Governance. A shared perceived barrier to responsible
innovation was that of internal workplace governance
systems. These were overly bureaucratic and time-
consuming procedures and governance mechanisms
ostensibly designed for quality assurance purposes.
All innovation, for example, irrespective of its
simplicity or complexity required being “vetted”
through tortuous processes: “ . . . [it] still has to be
approved before it can be actioned and I guess that’s
half the problem. If it sounds like a reasonable idea, give
it a go” [MG5]; “ . . . [you have] a zillion meetings”
[MG3]; “[h]alf the time you think what’s the point?
It’s going to take me 4months, 20 meetings and actually
all you’re trying to do is save half an hour’s work a
week”[MG5].
More specifically, the existence of institutional
research ethics protocols and requirements caused
some participants to question whether the more
ground breaking innovations of yesteryear could have
happened in what they perceived to be today’s more
risk averse culture. “If you try to get ethics approval in
this country, you struggle, you can’t get it. Most peo-
ple . . . do trials outside of the UK. And when they are
done, they bring it back in the UK” [MG 3].
Although some national governance initiatives were
considered to have potential to stymie responsible
innovation (“we are expected to follow NICE guide-
lines and . . . if you don’t follow NICE guidelines you
have to justify why” [MG 3]), local policies and proce-
dures were felt to exert a far greater impact. For one
surgeon,
you’ve got [governance] at international and national
and locals levels. For example, if you’re going to intro-
duce a new technique or technology into the Trust, you
have to approach NIPAG [New Interventional
Procedures Advisory Group]. [T]hat group will consid-
er what’s been proposed. [S3]
While the merits of robust governance was not
criticised per se, the possibility of duplication of
effort certainly was:
you have to go through a formal application process
even if this is a procedure which has been accepted in
places elsewhere . . . you have to go through that same
process to allow approval and often of course, it will be
on a case by case basis if they give you permission. And
it’s got be monitored very closely and audited. One can
understand, of course, that it’s with patient protection
in mind but you’ve got to question whether, if there are
plenty of other centres doing this, are we just re-
inventing the wheel each time. Shouldn’t it be a cen-
tralised process? [S3]
In fact, some surgeons felt that there was a patient
safety imperative for the introduction of more focused
governance arrangements:
[We need] an audit or a registry . . . I am amazed that
when there is a scandal [such as] breast implants, or hip
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re-surfacing, or whatever, [there is a call to] identify the
patients who have had this and then there is this sort
of, well, we don’t keep records of that . . .nobody
knows who’s had what and I find that quite staggering.
But despite all these regulatory checks, NIPAG
Committees and all the rest of it, at the end of the
day, when there is an individual problem, . . .we can’t
go on record and [see] who we need to recall. [S5]
There is “no simple way of saying: right, who across the
country has had this?” [S3] Another shared concern of
surgeons was that responsible innovation and clinical
developments were less likely to emerge from European
jurisdictions due to regulatory requirements and the
need for early clinical data: “to get a European CE
mark, you need clinical data . . . you have to start some-
where” [S4]. This apparent “chicken and egg” situation
was expected to push healthcare innovations to regions
considered to be more supportive such as South
America, China and Korea. Although oncologists
agreed that biotech companies were more reluctant to
innovate in the UK they felt that this was “because we
are perceived to be very expensive” [ONC 3]
For general practitioners, existing governance
regimes were perceived mainly as “top-down” control
mechanisms that tended to fetter discretion rather than
acting as a safety net for patients and staff.
Cost. All groups agreed on that cost was a significant
barrier to innovation. This is unsurprising, but what is
evident is that the notion of cost as a barrier is multi-
faceted. As noted by one surgeon, the cost of innova-
tion had to be separated from the cost of clinical
trials as money seemed to be available for the latter.
But deep frustration was displayed towards both the
government and hospital managers. According to one
oncologist “[w]e do not have government funding for
any level of innovation . . .we’re always at the mercy
of industry . . . [the] . . .mercy of biotech companies”
[ONC 1].
Lack of money inevitably led to support for innova-
tion being led by financial considerations rather than
patient benefit. A mixed group participant (an oncolo-
gist) made this point explicitly:
How is innovation judged? How is it great? What’s the
detriment? 99% of the time it’s financial. You want to
say that you can do something and it’s going to save
loads of money. It’s going to save us time, and time is
money. [MG 3]
Another participant agreed, noting that the “usual
mantra when any kind of originality was proposed
was to propose a business case” [MG 1]. The surgeons,
meanwhile, lamented that while there was money for
some developments, such as new IT systems, in a “cash
strapped NHS” this left little for surgical innovations
such as robots.
Yet it was not just a general lack of money, or that
money was being spent on wrong priorities. The theme
that came through was lack of managerial foresight.
According to several participants, it was not that
enough that money would be saved by the innovation;
instead the saving had to be made immediately. One
participant expressed:
one of the big barriers is the short sightedness of the
people making decisions. Because innovation may cost,
but in the long run, yes, saves money. They don’t care.
They want to see at the end of this financial year, we
have saved this. . . .And that’s the problem. [MG3]
This was echoed by another who said:
Nobody thinks of anything for five years. So if you
invest some money today, this year, and next year
and next year, and the third year you save a lot of
money, there’s no appetite for that. Only appetite is
for what you can see for this year . . . [GP7]
The problem of cost was not simply limited to how
much money was allocated to innovation overall –
though this was certainly a factor. The problem also
lies in the model of funding, where “quick fix” solutions
are incentivised and longer term planning disincenti-
vised. This is certainly a barrier against innovations
that require initial outlay but that could produce tan-
gible benefits later.
Miscellaneous issues. There were several other issues of
note. An anaesthetist felt that one of the barriers to
innovation was the difficulty in obtaining ethics
approval for trials. Others, including an oncologist
and several GPs cited a lack of time, particularly if
developing innovations was not part of their primary
role and therefore had to be carried out over and above
their regular duties. Indeed, these two factors are
linked. In both cases there was concern that before
ethics committees and other decision-makers would
consider proposals, some preliminary proof of concept
was required. Unfortunately, compiling the evidence
necessary to convince decision-makers to authorise
innovation was prohibitive. Even more fundamental
was that after completing a full patient list, there
was simply no “brain space” left to think about inno-
vation [GP5].
Another barrier recognised by several participants
was the profession’s innate conservatism that did not
foster a culture of innovation. One oncologist disagreed
that there was no time for innovation, but instead
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argued that there was no encouragement and therefore
innovation tended to be reactive rather than proactive:
“We always wait for things to go bad before we change”
[MG 3]. This was echoed by another in that: “It’s not
like our Trust, not like there is a medical innovation
fund, . . . there isn’t that sort of encouragement”
[MG 1]. But, ultimately, there was a feeling that even
if individuals were not actively prevented from innovat-
ing, they would still be reluctant to do so. One AHP
noted an inherent professional bias towards maintaining
the status quo; although for one oncologist the problem
was simple (though she was keen to exclude her imme-
diate colleagues): “we’re a bit conservative with a small
‘c’ about our approach to innovations . . . I just wonder
sometimes whether people aren’t risk takers” [ONC 1].
Discussion
The genesis of the project from which this paper derives
was Lord Saatchi’s Medical Innovation Bill, and in
particular the claim that the only significant barrier
to doctors providing innovative treatments was fear
of the law. For that reason, we analysed the data in
two parts: first, what doctors might fear in the form of
the law and regulators; second, the influence of other
factors. The results are instructive.
In relation to the law, we were surprised to find little
support for the notion that fear of litigation was a bar-
rier to innovation, and even less evidence that this was
the principal impediment. What was even more unex-
pected was that the specialties who were least con-
cerned by fear of the law were surgeons and
oncologists, which were the groups who were upper-
most in Lord Saatchi’s mind when he composed his
draft legislation. Even when fear of the law was men-
tioned as a potential barrier, as occurred in the mixed
group, the “defensive practices” described, in the form
of more careful note-taking and greater communica-
tion of risks to patients, were considered by the
group to be examples of good practice that could pro-
tect doctors and patients. The notable exception was
the group of GPs, who uniquely identified fear of the
law as a potentially serious barrier to providing inno-
vative treatment. However, even this finding has cav-
eats. First, this focus group defined medical innovation
in a way that was different to the other groups. For the
GPs, innovation was less about treatment provision
and more about processes and procedures to promote
efficiency, such as greater patient throughput. Second,
as primary practitioners and generalists, they are per-
haps not the group that Lord Saatchi envisaged when
he determined to loosen the shackles that he perceived
to be were preventing innovation. Indeed, it is notewor-
thy that only one comment was based on personal
experience, while other criticisms of the law appeared
to be more generalised. From our findings, we suggest
that for these participants, fear of the law was not a
significant barrier to medical innovation, particularly
for specialists.
The findings were similar in relation to fear of the
regulators. Although not considered to be a primary
concern, this could result from not following an oblig-
atory rule or protocol. In sum, the barrier to innova-
tion was not fear of regulatory sanction per se, but
failure to follow mandatory rules or protocols. Again,
it was notable that the surgeons and oncologists were
the most relaxed about the role of the regulator, not
least because they saw innovation as treatment rather
than experimentation. This aligns with the view that
where standard treatment will not work (as may be
the case with advanced cancer), providing it would be
futile and innovative treatment might be the only
option. Neither the law nor the regulator would disap-
prove of attempts to innovate in such circumstances,
and the specialists in our focus groups recognised this.31
If claims of fear being a barrier to innovation are
unfounded, the other themes identified give a flavour of
what the barriers actually are. The key point here is
that these are interlinked. At the root of everything,
in our view, is money. All groups identified cost as a
key factor preventing innovation. This is unsurprising,
but it does not make it any less true. It is clear that the
NHS is currently experiencing a funding crisis,32 and it
is neither unexpected nor unreasonable for managers to
allocate funds to treatments that they know will work,
rather than those that might. Moreover, this links with
the idea that only innovations likely to save money
immediately will be funded. Again, this speaks to a
health service that is under pressure to save money
today, rather than invest to save money tomorrow.
This position is clearly antithetical to encouraging
innovation. Equally, cost is a factor in relation to
access to drugs and devices. Some participants explic-
itly linked the two, while others alluded to it by men-
tioning NICE, for example. As noted, we were
unsurprised that cost was perceived as a key barrier,
although the short-termism that it engenders is perhaps
a less well-identified factor.
The other two barriers identified can be considered
together: governance and a lack of culture of innova-
tion. For the former, it appears that the logistical dif-
ficulty – in terms of the requisite approvals and
paperwork, and the uncertainty of outcome, prove
overly burdensome for many doctors. Essentially,
they are reluctant to innovate when they see the
length and difficulty of the journey to approval. This
might lead to the lack of a culture of innovation that
was referred to by participants. This factor was identi-
fied by the groups who felt constrained from innovat-
ing, but also the oncologists, who routinely innovate
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(although they were careful to exclude themselves from
this cultural malaise). But if the journey to approval is
perceived to be labyrinthine, it is not surprising that
this culture is fostered. Lack of resources may again
factor into these considerations, and might explain
the difficulty in securing approval. But as far as the
meetings and form filling are concerned, it is hard to
argue for a loosening of the systems that are put in
place (particularly in the case of research ethics, iden-
tified by one participant as a barrier to innovation) to
protect patients.
Conclusion
We began this research with two intentions: to ask
doctors what they felt the barriers to innovation
were, and within that to focus on whether the claims
made regarding fear of the law was indeed the principal
concern as Lord Saatchi had claimed. As discussed, we
did not find this to be the case, nor was fear of regu-
lators. On the basis of our findings, we argue that there
are two main barriers: lack of money and (perhaps
consequently) the absence of a supportive culture.
This is unsurprising and appears to link to other poten-
tial barriers such as managerial fiscal short-termism
and an overarching culture of conservatism on account
of the time and effort involved in making proposals
that were unlikely to be accepted.
Yet, it is important to note that neither of the main
proposals for legislative encouragement of medical
innovation – the unsuccessful Medical Innovation Bill
in the UK and “Right to Try” laws in the US – actually
provide any money that is not already available. In that
regard, neither would have made a difference to the
participants in our focus groups. That said, Lord
Saatchi has also spoken of his Medical Innovation
Bill changing the culture of the medical profession to
one that is more amenable to innovating.33 This is
closer to what we found in our focus groups, but with-
out more funding our research suggests that any
attempt to change the culture would be fruitless.
We must acknowledge the limitations of our
research. Our study was small, and we cannot claim
that it necessarily definitely provides a representative
sample of each specialty’s views. We do feel, however,
that they constitute an important snapshot of what the
perceived barriers to innovation might be, and what
they might not be, and that we can draw some tentative
conclusions. What our research has done is identified
what some of the barriers might be so that they can be
assessed in more detail. We have also not considered
any other issues, such as whether we want all doctors to
seek to innovate, what constitutes responsible innova-
tion (and conversely what constitutes irresponsible
innovation) or whether removing some of the barriers
would have the unintended consequence of allowing
bad actors into the medical marketplace. These are
important questions, and further research is required
to answer them.
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